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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
-v-
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
12823 
BRIEF' O·F DEFENDANT. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding is upon Writ of Review to review a 
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission, (hereinafter some-
times referred to as "the Commission" or "the Tax Commis-
sion"), under date of January 7, 1972, wherein said Commis-
sion assessed a motor fuel tax against plaintiff for motor fuel 
received and exchanged within the State of Utah (i.e., import-
ed into the State and subsequently exported therefrom) dur-
ing the period of January 1, 1968, through December 21, 1969, 
a period of twenty-four consecutive months (R. 2, 3, 14). 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
The Tax Commission, on January 7, 1972, issued an 
order assessing a motor fuel excise tax against taxpayer and 
ordered the same to be paid, which assessment totalled the sum 
of $75,376.59, together with interest in the amount of 
$5,252.91 (R. 5, 8, 9). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Defendant seeks an order of the Court affirming the de-
cision and order of the Tax Commission in the tax assessment 
made by said Commission against plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks 
an order vacating said decision and assessment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this action have entered into a stipulation 
of facts ( R. 14-18) , and these facts are incorporated into and 
restated in the decision of the Commission ( R. 1-6) , and in 
plaintiff's Brief; however, it appears appropriate at this point 
to emphasize certain additional facts not stressed in plaintiff's 
Brief. 
Plaintiff's Brief fails to indicate that the tax levied and 
imposed by the Commission is to be levied and imposed, pursu-
ant to Section 41-11-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, upon the 
sale or use of all motor fuels sold, used or received for sale or 
use in this State (unless specifically exempted), and that an 
exemption from such tax may be allowed when such "import-
ed" fuel is subsequently "exported" outside the State. With 
this minor exception, defendant agrees with the statement of 
facts as submitted in plaintiff's Brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ASSUMING THAT THE STATUTE REGARD-
ING THE SUBJECT EXEMPTION IS UNCLEAR, 
THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT INASMUCH AS 
EXEMPTIONS ARE NOT FAVORED, GRANTS 
OF EXEMPTION ARE TO BE STRICTLY CON-
STRUED IN FAVOR OF THE STATE. 
There is no dispute in the present action as to the statutory 
legality of the excise tax as it refers to motor fuels received for 
sale or use in the State; nor is there dispute as to the Tax Com-
mission's authority to establish such rules and regulations as 
may be necessary to administer the subject tax law. It is felt, 
however, that the following references may be of benefit to 
the Court in its consideration of the herein matter. 
that: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-7 (1953), requires 
"Every distributor of motor fuel shall render to 
the state tax commission . . . on forms prescribed, 
prepared and furnished by it, a statement . . . of the 
number of gallons of motor fuel sold, used or received 
for sale or use by (the distributor)." 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 4-11-6 (1953), requires 
that a tax be levied and imposed by the Commission on each 
gallon of motor fuel sold, used or received for sale or use by 
a distributor within the State of Utah unless such motor fuel 
is specifically exempted. 
Section 41-11-16 of Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
states that: 
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"The state tax commission may make and promul-
gate such r~a~ona~le rules and regulations pertaining 
to the admm1strat1on and enforcement of this act as 
the commission deems necessary." 
Further, there is no dispute as to whether or not the 
motor fuels in question fall within the taxing powers of the 
Commission unless exempt. The thrust of the dispute in the 
present case arises out of the Commission's application of the 
statutes and regulations involved, {specifically Section 41-11-
20, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), and Motor Fuels Tax Regu-
lation No. 3}, as well as certain other rules and regulations 
adopted and utilized by the Tax Commission in its administra-
tion of the Motor Fuels Tax Act. 
It is to be noted that the tax imposed in the present case 
is levied and imposed pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sec-
tion 41-11-6 (1953). That statute states, in part: 
"There is hereby levied and imposed a tax . 
upon the sale or use of all motor fuels sold, used or 
received for sale or use in this state, . " (Emphasis 
added.) 
Section 41-11-2(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953), deems 
motor fuels imported by any person into the State from any 
other state to be received ". . . at the time when and the place 
where the interstate transportation of such motor fuel shall 
have been completed within the State .... " There is no 
question as to the fact that the subject motor fuels were "re-
ceived" in the State of Utah and, subsequently, exported (R. 
2, 14); nor is there any question as to plaintiff's failure to re-
port the receipt of such fuels as required by Utah Code Anno-
tated, Section 41-11-7 (1953) (R. 2, 14, 15). 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-6 (195 3), makes 
it clear that the tax is levied and imposed when the motor fuels 
are received into the State, and that such tax is to be imposed 
on all such motor fuels. No motor fuels, including "exported" 
motor fuels, are automatically exempt from such taxation. For 
such an exemption, an application must be made within 180 
days after exportation. With particular reference to Section 
41-11-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953), wherein export sales 
are exempted, one claiming an exemption, must furnish proof 
of actual exportation upon blanks furnished by the Tax Com-
mission. That same statute further states: 
" ... and in accordance with the rules and regu-
lations promulgated by it, (the Commission) the state 
tax commission shall, as the case may be, either collect 
no tax or refund the amount of tax paid to the person 
who paid it on his application made within 180 days 
after exportation .... " (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff states that the statute referenced immediately above 
is unclear as to whether or not the 180-day limitation applies 
to the collection of the tax and the refund or just to the refund 
provision alone. 
The rules and regulations as published by the Commis-
sion attempt to clarify the situation. Defendant's Motor Fuels 
Tax Regulation No. 3 states: 
"In all cases, claims for credit or refund must be 
made within 180 days from date of export . . . ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Defendant respectfully submits that the word "credit" does 
not mean "collect no tax'', nor does it mean "refund" or "ex-
emption". [Cf. Kupper v. Fiscal Courts of Jefferson County, 
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346 S.W. 2d 766, 767 (1961), wherein the Kentucky Court 
stated that an "exemption" completely absolved a potential tax-
payer from any liability for tax whatsoever, while "credit" re-
lieved the taxpayer from direct payment of all or a portion of 
a particular tax on the theory that it had been satisfied by some 
other method.} The Commission could allow no exemption 
inasmuch as application was not timely made, nor could it 
allow a "credit" as the tax had not been satisfied by paymen~ 
or other method. It most certainly could not be assumed that 
the Commission did not intend to ever collect a tax on fuels 
received into the State pursuant to the statute. The Commis-
sion submits that the statute and the rule are not so unclear 
as to cause confusion relative to a distributor's obligation to 
pay a tax thereunder. What the Tax Commission attempts in 
this case is to collect a properly levied and imposed tax on an 
unreported and unaccounted for imported fuel (not an "ex-
empt" fuel) and has decided not to allow an exemption, or 
credit (since the tax has not been satisfied by other methods) , 
because of plaintiff's failure to apply for such within the 180-
day limitation. 
In any event, even if we were to assume an ambiguity 
exists in the "exemption" statute {Utah Code Annotated, Sec-
tion 41-11-20 ( 1953)} and in Regulation No. 3, while as a 
general rule, ambiguities in general taxing statutes result in 
construction of such statute in favor of the taxpayer and against 
the taxing entity (see 5 1 Am. J ur., Taxation, § 316) , statutes 
relating to exemptions are to be construed strictly in favor of 
the State and against the one seeking exemption. 
"Since taxation is the rule and exemption is the 
exception, and since exemptions from taxation are ?-ot 
favored, the general rule is that a grant of exemption 
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from taxation is never presumed." ( 84 C.J.S., Taxa-
tion, § 225) 
"{SJ ince . . . exemptions from taxation are not 
favored, an alleged . . . statutory grant of exemption 
will be strictly construed in favor of the state and taxa-
tion and against the taxpayer and exemption, and 
in following this rule of strict construction all 
doubts will be resolved against the claimed exemption. 
Such a privilege or immunity cannot be made out by 
inference or implication, but must be conferred in terms 
too clear and plain to be mistaken, and in fact admit-
ting of no reasonable doubt, and where it exists it 
should be carefully scrutinized and not permitted to 
extend either in scope or duration beyond what the 
terms of the concession clearly require or allow, or so 
as to create an absolute and irrevocable exemption un-
less the language of the statute clearly so requires." 
(Ibid at § 227) 
Defendant submits that the general rules set forth above 
apply to the instant case, and that the allowance of exemption 
in this matter would be the result of inference or implication 
[assuming that Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-20 
( 19 5 3 ) , is not clear as to its application} and would extend 
the privilege beyond what the concession clearly allows. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CONDITIONS FOR OBTAIN-
ING AN EXEMPTION ARE NOT UNREASON-
ABLE, AND PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO COM-
PLY THEREWITH IS SUFFICIENT GROUND 
FOR THE COMMISSION TO DENY SUCH EX-
EMPTION. 
In McClure v. City of Texarkana, 435 S.W. 2d 599 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1968), a statute provided an exemption from prop-
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erty tax and property used for public colleges and public acade-
mies. The statute stated, in part: 
" ... provided, however, that said schools .. . 
desiring the right of exemption of the properties .. . 
shall first prepare and file with the tax assessor . . . a 
complete itemized statement of all said property . . . ." 
(See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Art. 7150, Par. 1 ( 1960) ). 
In that case, the appellant had property which was used for 
school purposes, but she had failed to file the proper state-
ment with the assessor. In holding that the appellant was not 
now entitled to the exemption, the Court said: 
"Because exemption from taxation is not favored, 
the person or institution claiming an exemption must 
satisfy in detail all the substantive requirements of the 
law that grants it." ( 435 S.W. 2d at 601, and cases 
therein cited.) 
In the California case of First Unitarian Church of Los 
Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 48 C 2d 419, 311 P.2d 
508 (1957), the California Supreme Court, in holding that a 
State Constitution section making nonadvocacy of an over· 
throw of government by unlawful means a condition to tax 
exemption was not repugnant to the Federal Constitution, 
stated: 
"{A}n exemption from taxation is the exception 
and the unusual. . . . It may be granted with or with-
ont (sic) conditions but where reasonable conditions 
are imposed they must be complied with." 311 P.2d at 
512. 
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-
Plaintiff attempts to weaken defendant's position by set-
ting forth in its Brief comment relative to the failure of Regula-
tion No. 3 to refer to Form TC-110 D-1. Plaintiff admits that 
licensed distributors must report on Form TC-11 O D-1 that 
information which is relative to exported fuels. Regulation 
No. 3 admittedly refers only to TC-112, and, in fact, applies 
only to unlicensed distributors. In practice and application, the 
Form TC-112 is submitted by an unlicensed distributor through 
a licensed distributor. The licensed distributor must then make 
a report to the Commission relative to exported fuels on a 
Form TC-110 D-1. (See Motor Fuels Tax, Regulation No. 3, 
paragraph No. 4, as cited R. 4, 16). The Form TC-112 is 
not submitted to the Commission but is retained in the licensed 
distributors' files in support of the exportation of fuels via an 
unlicensed distributor. Plaintiff makes no claim as to its lack 
of awareness of the regulations as used and applied by the 
Commission. The forms "prescribed, prepared and furnished" 
by the Commission are explanatory as to the procedure to be 
used in situations such as the instant case. (Cf. Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 41-11-7 (1953) ). 
Defendant contends that the rules and regulations as 
applied by the Commission are reasonable conditions and must 
be complied with in an attempt to obtain exemption. Plaintiff's 
failure to satisfy in detail all of the substantive requirements 
of the law granting such exemption results in its ineligibility 
for same. 
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POINT III 
TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S INTERPRETATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 41-
11-20 (1953), WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE 
LAW GIVE PREFERENCE TO PERSONS FAIL-
ING TO PROPERLY REPORT IMPORTED 
MOTOR FUELS. 
As has been set forth above, the Utah State Legislature 
has required that a tax be levied and imposed on all motor fuels 
sold or used or received for sale or use in the State. The motor 
fuels in question here were indeed received in the State for 
"sale" or "use" ( R. 2, 14, 15). As above set forth and pursu-
ant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-11-7 (1953), every 
distributor delivering motor fuel within the State must make 
written report of all such deliveries to the State Tax Commis-
sion. To allow plaintiff to prevail in its argument that the 180-
day limitation of Section 41-11-20, Utah Code Annotated 
(195 3) applies only to claims for refund as opposed to the 
ability of the Commission to collect the tax would give prefer-
ence to those distributors failing to initially report fuels re-
ceived by them for sale or use as against those who properly 
file such report. (i.e., one who properly filed a report of re· 
ceipt of fuel would lose his 180-day exemption if he failed to 
apply for same within the prescribed time; whereas, one who 
failed to make the proper initial report would not lose an 
exemption as there would be no recorded "receipt" of motor 
fuels on which to levy and impose a tax, and no time would 
run against such. 
Further, if the practice of Atlantic-Richfield of not re-
porting the sale were allowed, the Tax Commission would be 
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deprived of the information it needs to properly administer the 
act. Evidence of the Legislature's intent to provide the Tax 
Commission with reports on all fuel received is the fact that 
until 1933, the statute simply said: "Said excise tax shall not 
be imposed on motor fuel when sold for export from this 
State." {Revised Statutes of Utah, § 57-12-15 (1953)}. In 
1933, the Legislature amended the statute to provide for the 
proof of actual exportation on application within sixty days. 
(19 3 3 Utah Laws, Ch. 41, § 1 ) . The Code has since been 
amended to allow exporters to claim their exemption by furn-
ishing the Tax Commission with proof of actual exportation 
and an application within the 180-day period. To permit a 
longer period of time would create a hardship on the Commis-
sion, insofar as auditing of records and examination thereof is 
concerned in attempting to obtain proof of "export sales". A 
shorter period of time would perhaps not allow the taxpayer 
a reasonable period in which to offer his proof of export sales. 
POINT IV 
THE DEOSION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS 
NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, NOR WAS IT 
BASED ON PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES 
SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW IT TO BE DISTURB-
ED BY THE COURT. 
The Utah case of McKendrick v. State Tax Commission, 
9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177, (1959), while dealing with a 
proceeding for review of a decision of the Tax Commission 
assessing a deficiency for state sales tax on a taxpayer's sale of 
artificial limbs, did set forth this Court's feelings with regard 
to the latitude necessary to be granted to the Commission in 
the performance of its duties and to the hesitancy of the Court 
11 
---
to disturb decisions made by the Commission. The Court 
therein said, in part: 
"{NJ otwithstanding the fact the statute provid-
ing for review by this court of decisions of the tax 
commission allows it to be made 'both upon the law 
and the facts', we nevertheless allow considerable lati-
tude to the determination made by the Tax Commis-
sion and do not disturb it unless it is clearly erroneous." 
(347 P.2d at 178 and cases therein cited.) 
There has been no claim made of actual irregularity by 
the Commission in the performance of its duties with respect 
to the matter at hand. However, plaintiff would make it ap-
pear in its Brief that the application of Commission rules is 
inconsistent and irregular. Defendant submits that there is no 
ground or evidence upon which to make this determination 
and, in fact, states that plaintiff is treated equally with all 
other persons or entities in the same situation. However, even 
if we were to assume certain irregularities were to take place, 
such is generally not sufficient to warrant a relief from a tax 
obligation. 84 C.J.S. Taxation §720 makes this point clear 1 
in commenting: 
"In the absence of statutory prohibition, a court 
of equity may enjoin the collection of a tax which is 
entirely illegal or levied without any authority, and 
which, therefore, in justice and good conscience, the 
citizen should not be compelled to pay; but such relief 
will not be granted because of mere errors or irregu-
larities in the proceedings not affecting the substantial 
justice of the tax, or because of technical objections or 
circumstances of hardship in the particular case which 
do not undermine the foundations of complainant's 
obligations to pay his tax, or where the relief will end 
in injustice." (Emphasis added.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Even if we are to asswne that the Motor Fuels Tax Act 
and the Motor Fuels Tax Regulation No. 3, as they relate to 
exemptions, are unclear, and inasmuch as the Commission's 
conditions for obtaining an exemption are not unreasonable, 
nor was the Commission's decision below clearly erroneous or 
based on substantial procedural irregularities, and in light of 
the fact that to allow an exemption in the instant matter 
would be to favor those who fail to comply with the Com-
mission's rules and regulations and prejudice those who do 
comply, and in the further light that exemptions are not fav-
ored and grants of same are to be strictly construed in favor 
of the State, it is respectfully requested that the decision of 
the Tax Commission be upheld, and that plaintiff be ordered 
to pay to the Commission the amount of the tax assessed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
G. BLAINE DAVIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
GREGORY D. FARLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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